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The current article outlines a behavior-analytic approach to the study of so-
called implicit attitudes and cognition. The Implicit Relational Assessment Pro-
cedure (IRAP), the conceptual basis of which was derived from relational frame 
theory, is offered as a methodology that may be used in the experimental anal-
ysis of implicit attitudes and beliefs. The relational elaboration and coherence 
(REC) model provides a possible relational-frame account of the findings that 
have emerged from the IRAP. The article first outlines the research history that 
led to the development of the IRAP, followed by a description of the method. 
The REC model and how it explains a range of IRAP data are then considered. 
The article also outlines how both the IRAP and the REC model overlap with, 
and differ from, similar research found in the non-behavior-analytic literature. 
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Imagine if you were asked, “Do you prefer 7UP or Pepsi?” Assuming that 
you do have a particular preference, you would likely respond quickly and 
with little thought or deliberation. Furthermore, your answer would almost 
certainly correspond to the drink you typically choose. Imagine, however, if 
you were asked, “Do you prefer white or black people?” Responding to this 
question seems to differ quite dramatically from the first question. Indeed, 
the question itself may be considered inappropriate or even insulting 
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because the answer you provide could be used to judge or label you nega-
tively in some way (e.g., as a racist). Thus you may be inclined to pause for 
thought, if only briefly, before answering. In addition, your response to the 
question may not correspond with other aspects of your social behavior—
if you answer, for example, “I have no preference,” but virtually all of your 
friends, neighbors, and acquaintances are from your own racial group. In 
short, the first question may produce an answer that is based almost en-
tirely on an immediate or automatic response to the choice between 7UP 
and Pepsi, whereas the latter question may generate some thought before an 
answer is offered (e.g., “Although all of my friends are white, I am not racist, 
and so I have no preference”).
Recognizing this difference in how particular questions may be an-
swered seems to be critically important in the study of attitudes and beliefs 
and how they relate to actual behavior. If, for example, racially biased ac-
tions are better predicted in certain contexts by automatic rather than delib-
erative responses, it is essential that appropriate methods be developed that 
can assess such automatic reactions. The current article provides a prelimi-
nary exploration (or sketch) of the methodological, empirical, and theoretical 
development of one such methodology—the Implicit Relational Assessment 
Procedure, or IRAP1 (all IRAP articles cited herein are available for download 
from http://psychology.nuim.ie/IRAP/IRAP_1.shtml).
the IRAp: history and method
history
The study of human language and cognition has attracted increasing 
attention from behavior analysts, with some researchers focusing on stimu-
lus equivalence and derived stimulus relations2 (e.g., Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Roche, 2001; Sidman, 1994). Relatively early in this research program, a 
number of investigators attempted to develop methods for assessing natu-
ral verbal relations using procedures that were employed in the study of 
stimulus equivalence. The basic approach involves training and testing for 
laboratory -induced equivalence classes that are likely to conflict with spe-
cific preexisting verbal relations. Critically, it is predicted that the emer-
gence of laboratory-induced classes will be hindered because they compete 
with the natural verbal relations.
The first study in this area focused on the topic of sectarian or reli-
gious categorization. The study employed a sample of adult participants 
who resided in Northern Ireland and a group of English participants who 
1 The word implicit indicates that the IRAP was designed to measure the probability of 
automatic responding; this issue is considered in detail in the context of the relational elaboration 
and coherence (REC) model, which is outlined in the second half of this article.
2 In a typical study of stimulus equivalence, a series of interrelated conditional 
discriminations are first reinforced, and then a number of untaught but predictable stimulus 
relations are seen to emerge in the absence of explicit feedback or verbal instruction. During the 
training, for example, A–B and B–C matching-to-sample (MTS) responses might be taught. A series 
of test or probe MTS trials are then presented in which symmetry (B–A, C–B), transitivity (A–C), 
and combined symmetry and transitivity (C–A) may be observed in the absence of differential 
reinforcement. If these emergent or untrained patterns of responding occur, the stimuli are said 
to participate in an equivalence class or derived relation.
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did not (Watt, Keenan, Barnes, & Cairns, 1991). In Northern Ireland the 
verbal community frequently categorizes specific family names and sym-
bols with either the Protestant or Catholic religions (Cairns, 1984), but 
this verbal practice is rarely found in England. In the Watt et al. study, 
the initial training involved matching Catholic family names to nonsense 
syllables and the same nonsense syllables to Protestant symbols, and all 
participants successfully completed this phase. However, the critical equiv-
alence test involved matching the Catholic names directly to the Protestant 
symbols, and many of the Northern Irish participants failed this test, but 
the English participants did not. In effect, the verbal relations previously 
established within the Northern Irish verbal community appeared to dis-
rupt or retard the formation of laboratory- induced equivalence relations. 
Since this study was published, the basic effect has been replicated and 
extended across a range of other content domains, including academic self-
concept (Barnes, lawlor, Smeets, & Roche, 1996), terrorism (Dixon, Rehfeldt, 
Zlomke, & Robinson, 2006), clinical anxiety (leslie et al., 1993), and self-
esteem (Merwin & Wilson, 2005).
The foregoing approach to assessing natural verbal relations, by pitting 
those relations against laboratory-induced equivalence classes, provided 
the conceptual foundation for creating the IRAP. Methodologically, the IRAP 
drew heavily on earlier work with what is called the relational evaluation 
procedure (REP).3 The REP presents participants with a task that requires 
them to evaluate, or report on, the stimulus relation that is presented on 
a given trial. For example, two identical shapes might be presented with 
the relational terms “Same” and “opposite,” and participants are required 
to indicate, typically without time pressure, that the relation is “Same” (see 
o’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2004; o’Hora, Pelaez, Barnes-
Holmes, & Amesty, 2005; Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2002, 2004). 
Indeed, the importance of the REP in developing the IRAP was such that 
initially the IRAP was called the IREP. Nevertheless, the IRAP acronym was 
soon adopted because it can be read as “I rap,” as in “I talk quickly,” which, 
conceptually, is what the IRAP asks a participant to do.
like the REP, the IRAP involves presenting specific relational terms (e.g., 
similar, opposite, more, less) so that the properties of the relations among 
the relevant stimuli can be assessed. Unlike the REP, the IRAP involves ask-
ing participants to respond quickly and accurately in ways that are either 
consistent or inconsistent with their preexperimentally established verbal 
relations. The basic hypothesis is that average response latencies for a group 
of participants should be shorter across blocks of consistent trials than 
across inconsistent trials. In addition, the extent of the observed difference 
between the trials is assumed to provide an index of the strength of the 
verbal or relational responses being assessed.
method
The IRAP is presented on a computer, with detailed instructions 
typically provided to participants before they commence the IRAP itself. 
(Software and sample instructions are available from http://psychology.
3 Research on the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) 
also provided an important methodological basis for the development of the IRAP (see Barnes-
Holmes, Hayden, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2008).
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nuim.ie/IRAP/IRAP_1.shtml; access to a web-based version of the procedure 
is also available at this site; see Figure 1 for a schematic representation of 
the IRAP.) on each trial of the IRAP one of two label stimuli is presented 
at the top of the computer screen, with one of two types of target stimuli 
presented in the center. Participants are required to choose between two re-
sponse options, which appear at the bottom left and right of the screen, by 
pressing either the “D” or “K” key; the left–right positions of the response 
options switch randomly from trial to trial. As an illustrative example, sup-
pose that the two labels are the words “Pleasant” and “Unpleasant,” the 
target stimuli are six positive words (e.g., “love,” “Happy,” “Peace”) and six 
negative words (e.g., “Hate,” “Sad,” “War”), and the two response options are 
“Similar” and “opposite.” During a block of consistent trials, a response 
defined as consistent with prevailing verbal contingencies (e.g., choosing 
“Similar” given “Pleasant” and “love”) clears the screen for 400 ms and then 
the next trial is presented. If an inconsistent response is emitted (e.g., choos-
ing “opposite” given “Pleasant” and “love”), a red X appears immediately 
under the target stimulus. To remove the red X and continue to the 400-ms 
intertrial interval, participants are required to emit the consistent response. 
In contrast, during inconsistent blocks participants are required to make an 
inconsistent response in order to progress from one trial to the next (a con-
sistent response produces the red X ).4
The IRAP typically consists of a minimum of two practice blocks and 
a fixed set of six test blocks.5 Each block presents the same number of tri-
als, comprised of what are defined as four different trial types. The trial 
types are created by presenting each label with each of two sets of target 
words (see Figure 1). Given the previous example, a block of consistent trials 
thus requires the following pattern of responses: Pleasant–Positive–Similar, 
Pleasant–Negative–Opposite, Unpleasant–Positive–Opposite, Unpleasant–
Negative–Similar. A block of inconsistent trials requires the opposite re-
sponse pattern (Pleasant–Positive–Opposite , Pleasant–Negative–Similar, 
etc.). The feedback contingencies are reversed across successive blocks of 
the IRAP, and thus participants are exposed to an alternating sequence of 
consistent and inconsistent blocks. The order in which this sequence is pre-
sented (consistent followed by inconsistent or inconsistent followed by con-
sistent) is often counterbalanced across participants.6
After each block of the IRAP, participants are informed that the previ-
ously correct and incorrect answers will be reversed in the next block, thus 
removing any requirement for trial-and-error learning after the first block. 
Each IRAP block presents each target stimulus once in the presence of each 
of the two labels (a minimum of six and a maximum of 12 target stimuli per 
4 At the time of writing, our research group had just begun to explore the use of multiple 
label stimuli in the IRAP. For example, rather than presenting only “Pleasant” or “Unpleasant” 
on each trial, other semantically similar labels are presented on other trials, such as “Good” or 
“Bad.” Very early findings suggest that using multiple labels may increase effect sizes.
5 The number of test blocks presented by the IRAP software can be adjusted to two, four, 
or six, but at the time of writing our research group had not explored the effect of manipulating 
this variable.
6 Thus far, our research has failed to find any important significant effects for the order in 
which the IRAP blocks are presented (McKenna, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2007; 
Power, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009; Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Stewart, 2009).
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label may be entered into the software, thus allowing for a range of 24 to 48 
trials per block). The trials are presented quasirandomly, with the typical 
constraint that none of the four trial types be presented twice in succes-
sion.7 The positioning of the two response options is also quasirandom in 
that typically they cannot appear in the same left–right position three times 
in succession.8
Pleasant–Positive
Pleasant
Love
Consistent Inconsistent
select ‘d’ for
Similar
select ‘k’ for
Opposite
Pleasant–Negative
Pleasant
Hate
Inconsistent Consistent
select ‘d’ for
Similar
select ‘k’ for
Opposite
Unpleasant–Negative
Unpleasant
War
Consistent Inconsistent
select ‘d’ for
Similar
select ‘k’ for
Opposite
Unpleasant–Positive
Unpleasant
Peace
Inconsistent Consistent
select ‘d’ for
Similar
select ‘k’ for
Opposite
Figure 1. An example of four IRAP trial types. The label (“Pleasant” or “Unpleasant”), 
target word (“Love,” “Hate,” “Peace,” or “War”), and response options (“Similar” and 
“Opposite”) appear simultaneously on each trial. Arrows with superimposed text boxes 
indicate which responses are deemed consistent or inconsistent (boxes and arrows do 
not appear on screen). Selecting the consistent response option during a consistent 
block, or the inconsistent option during an inconsistent block, clears the screen for 
400 ms before the next trial is presented; if the inconsistent option is chosen during a 
consistent block or the consistent option during an inconsistent block, a red X appears 
on screen until the participant emits the alternative response. In very recent studies, 
the warning message “Too Slow” appears below the target if a participant fails to 
respond within a specified latency criterion.
For the practice blocks, participants are informed that it is a practice 
phase and errors are expected. on-screen feedback is provided after each 
block, which indicates the percentage of correct responses and median 
7 The number of times a trial type may be repeated can be adjusted by the IRAP software, 
but at the time of writing our research group had not explored the effect of manipulating this 
variable.
8 The number of times the response options may appear in the same position may be 
changed by the software, but unpublished research by our group indicates that this variable has 
little impact on IRAP performance.
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response latency for that block. Participants are typically required to reach 
a standard of 80% correct responses9 and a median response time of less 
than 2,000 ms.10 These criteria are used to ensure that participants under-
stand and are complying with the IRAP instructions. If participants fail to 
achieve the two criteria for either of the two practice blocks, the required 
standard and the standard of responding they have achieved are presented 
on the screen, and they are invited to try again. Participants are allowed 
four attempts to achieve the practice criteria (a total of eight practice blocks), 
and if they fail to do so, they are thanked and debriefed and their data are 
discarded.11 Participants who achieve the practice criteria proceed to the six 
test blocks.
The procedure for the test blocks is similar to the practice blocks, ex-
cept that on-screen instructions inform participants that each block is a 
test and to “go quickly,” although making “a few errors is okay.” The same 
alternating sequence employed with the practice blocks is also used with 
the test blocks. Thus, if a participant is exposed to a consistent– inconsistent 
sequence during practice, Test Blocks 1, 3, and 5 are consistent and Test 
Blocks 2, 4, and 6 are inconsistent; if practice involved an inconsistent– 
consistent sequence, then Test Blocks 1, 3, and 5 are inconsistent and 2, 4, 
and 6 are consistent. No performance criteria are applied during the test 
blocks in order to proceed, but if a participant’s performance falls below 
the practice accuracy criterion (e.g., 80%) for any test block, the data for that 
participant typically are discarded.12 When all six test blocks have been pre-
sented, the IRAP is complete.
The primary datum from the IRAP is response latency, defined as the 
time in milliseconds (ms) that elapses between the onset of the trial and 
a correct response emitted by a participant. The response latency data for 
each participant are typically transformed into D
IRAP
 scores (or IRAP ef-
fects) using the D
IRAP
 algorithm, derived from the D algorithm developed by 
Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) for the IAT (see also Back, Schmukle, 
Egloff, & Gutenberg, 2005; Cai, Sriram, Greenwald, & McFarland, 2004; Mierke 
9 This criterion may be reduced to 70% if it becomes apparent that a particular sample of 
participants cannot achieve the higher criterion (e.g., Vahey et al., 2009).
10 Initially, our research group typically used a 3,000-ms criterion, but recent research 
indicates that reducing this to 2,000 ms increases the validity and reliability of the IRAP 
performance (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010). on balance, it is important 
to emphasize that the latency criterion, similar to accuracy, should be adjusted, preferably based 
on pilot work, to a level appropriate for the population that is being sampled and the stimuli that 
are being used in the study (e.g., if statements rather than single words are used as labels and/
or targets, the latency criterion may need to be 3,000 ms or more to avoid high attrition rates).  
11 In some studies a maximum of three exposures to the practice blocks were presented, 
but our experience indicates that a maximum of four may be used without incurring fatigue and 
boredom effects among most participants.
12 In order to encourage participants to maintain rapid responding during the test blocks, 
a recent version of the IRAP software has a setting that presents the warning message “Too 
Slow” on any trial for which a participant fails to respond within the latency criterion. When 
using this latency feedback our research group typically calculates the mean latency for each 
of the four trial types across the three consistent and the three inconsistent blocks, and if any 
of the eight mean latencies exceeds the practice latency criterion (e.g., 2,000 ms), the data for 
that participant are discarded. Thus, the IRAP test performance must remain within both the 
accuracy and latency criteria. The importance of both accurate and rapid responding on the IRAP 
is addressed later in this article.
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& Klauer, 2003). The D transformation functions to minimize the impact 
of factors such as age, motor skills, and/or cognitive ability on latency 
data, allowing researchers to measure differences between groups using a 
response-latency paradigm with reduced contamination by individual dif-
ferences associated with extraneous factors13 (Greenwald et al., 2003). on 
balance, it is important to note that the data-analytic techniques outlined 
below are merely a description of the practices that have evolved within a 
single research group, and as such the D
IRAP
 algorithm should not be seen as 
prescriptive or necessarily the “best way” to analyze IRAP data. 
The steps involved in calculating the D
IRAP
 scores are as follows: (1) 
only response-latency data from test blocks are used; (2) latencies above 
10,000 ms from the data set are eliminated; (3) all data for a participant are 
removed if he or she produces more than 10% of test-block trials with laten-
cies less than 300 ms; (4) 12 standard deviations for the four trial types 
are computed: four from the response latencies from Test Blocks 1 and 2, 
four from the latencies from Test Blocks 3 and 4, and a further four from 
Test Blocks 5 and 6; (5) 24 mean latencies for the four trial types in each 
test block are calculated; (6) difference scores are calculated for each of 
the four trial types for each pair of test blocks by subtracting the mean 
latency of the consistent block from the mean latency of the corresponding 
inconsistent block; (7) each difference score is divided by its corresponding 
standard deviation from step 4, yielding 12 D
IRAP
 scores, one score for each 
trial type for each pair of test blocks; (8) four overall trial-type D
IRAP
 scores, 
or IRAP effects, are calculated by averaging the scores for each trial type 
across the three pairs of test blocks.14 The four trial-type scores for each 
participant are then used to calculate mean D
IRAP
 scores across a group 
of participants, and these may be presented on a bar graph, such as that 
shown in Figure 2.
The data presented in Figure 2 are from a pilot study that employed 
two groups of soccer fans; one group supported the london-based English 
soccer team, Chelsea, and the other group supported the Spanish team, 
Barcelona. The IRAP presented the words “Chelsea” and “Barcelona” as la-
bels with six positive target words (e.g., “Great,” “Brilliant,” “Amazing,” 
etc.) and six negative target words (“Bad,” “Awful,” “Rubbish,” etc.) and the 
response options “Similar” and “opposite.” The data indicated predictable 
13 The first IRAP studies (e.g., Barnes-Holmes et al., 2008) did not employ the D
IRAP
 
algorithm because individual differences were not being measured. However, our research group 
often uses the algorithm for two main reasons. First, a recent study has shown that when IRAP 
difference scores are calculated without using the D transformation, they correlate significantly 
with intelligence (o’Toole & Barnes-Holmes, 2009), which may serve to confound the IRAP 
measure when factors other than IQ are being assessed. Critically, when the D IRAP transformation 
was applied to the same data, no significant correlations with IQ were observed (data not reported 
in the o’Toole & Barnes-Holmes article). Second, using a D algorithm facilitates a comparison 
between the IRAP and the IAT or other implicit measures that use a D transformation (e.g., 
Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010). 
14 In some of the early IRAP studies the data were analyzed separately for each of the 
three pairs of test blocks. In general, differences in response latency between consistent and 
inconsistent blocks did not change significantly across the block pairs, and thus this variable has 
been ignored in subsequent studies. Furthermore, analyzing block effects seems unwise when 
examining the data at the level of the individual trial type. Specifically, the number of responses 
used to calculate a trial-type D score from a single pair of test blocks could be a few as 12 (i.e., six 
responses on each block), which is very low for a reaction-time-based measure. 
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pro-Chelsea and anti-Barcelona IRAP effects for the Chelsea supporters and 
the reverse effects for the Barcelona supporters.15 For example, the mean 
D
IRAP
 score for the Chelsea–Positive trial type showed that the Chelsea group 
responded more quickly when “Similar” rather than “opposite” was the 
correct response; in contrast, the Barcelona group responded more quickly 
when “opposite” rather than “Similar” was correct. Interestingly, the D
IRAP
 
scores were larger when the participants responded to the trial types that 
presented their own rather than the other team as the label. In effect, it ap-
peared that supporters responded more positively toward their own team 
than they did negatively toward the other team.
Barcelona
Negative
IRAP Trial Types
M
ea
n 
D
IR
A
P
 S
co
re
s Pro-Chelsea / 
Anti-Barcelona
Chelsea Supporters
Barcelona Supporters
Pro-Barcelona
Anti-Chelsea
Similar
Similar
Similar
Similar
Opposite
Opposite
Opposite
Opposite
.8
.6
.4
.2
0
-.2
-.4
-.6
-.8
Chelsea
Positive
Chelsea
Negative
Barcelona
Positive
Figure 2. An illustrative example of how the data from four IRAP trial types may be 
presented on a bar graph. The data are from a pilot study that employed two groups 
of soccer fans; one group supported the London-based English soccer team, Chelsea, 
and the other group supported the Spanish team, Barcelona. The IRAP presented the 
words “Chelsea” and “Barcelona” as labels with six positive and six negative target 
words and the response options “Similar” and “Opposite.” On the graph, positive D
IRAP
 
scores indicate pro-Chelsea/anti-Barcelona IRAP effects and negative D
IRAP
 scores reflect 
pro-Barcelona/anti-Chelsea effects. The zero point indicates no preference. The words 
“Similar” and “Opposite” indicate which response option was chosen more quickly 
across the test blocks. For the Chelsea–Positive trial type, for example, the Chelsea 
supporters chose “Similar” more quickly than “Opposite,” but the Barcelona supporters 
choose “Opposite” more quickly than “Similar.”
Analyses of variance (mixed repeated measures) are typically used to 
test for significant main and interaction effects, and planned one-sample 
t tests are employed to determine if the mean D
IRAP
 scores differ significantly 
from zero. The internal consistency of the IRAP measures may be assessed 
by calculating split-half reliability scores for each trial type. In each case, 
one score for odd trials and one for even trials are calculated, and these 
are obtained in the same way as for the four original scores except that the 
algorithm described previously is applied separately to all odd trials and 
to all even trials. Split-half correlations, applying Spearman-Brown correc-
tions, are then calculated. If explicit measures (e.g., questionnaires or other 
15 When the IRAP is used to examine group differences in this manner, defining the 
blocks as consistent versus inconsistent per se may be confusing because the consistent blocks 
for one group will likely be the inconsistent blocks for the other group (and vice versa). In such 
cases, it seems more appropriate to refer to the blocks as pro-X/anti-Y versus pro-Y/anti-X (see 
Figure 2 for an example).
535THE IRAP AND THE REC MoDEl
rating scales) have been employed, the results of these may be correlated 
with the D
IRAP
 scores and, if appropriate, regression analyses may be used to 
determine if the IRAP effects provide incremental predictive validity over 
the explicit measures.
Although IRAP data may be analyzed at the level of the four trial types, 
it may simplify the analyses if the data are collapsed across two of the trial 
types (provided that doing so does not obscure a theoretically important 
effect). For the results presented in Figure 2, for example, the data could 
be collapsed across the trial types for each soccer team, yielding a single 
mean D
IRAP
 score for Chelsea and another for Barcelona (i.e., two IRAP ef-
fects for each group of supporters). Indeed, adopting this strategy for these 
data would likely be acceptable because the to-be-collapsed scores do not 
differ substantively from each other. Finally, it is worth noting that a single 
overall D
IRAP
 score (calculated across all four trial types) is sometimes re-
ported, and this measure is also used to calculate split-half reliability and 
may be employed in correlations and regression analyses with the relevant 
explicit measures.
In concluding this section, it is important to note that the relationship 
between IRAP effects and explicit measures is often of critical importance. 
For example, one approach to establishing the validity of the IRAP is to 
conduct a “known-groups” analysis, in which IRAP effects are used to pre-
dict participants’ self-reports of specific preferences or behaviors. The data 
presented in Figure 2 provide a simple example of a known-groups test in 
which the direction of the IRAP effects is consistent with the participants’ 
self-reported team allegiances (for other examples see Barnes-Holmes, 
Murtagh, et al., 2010; Barnes-Holmes, Waldron, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 
2009; Vahey et al., 2009). on balance, perhaps the most interesting feature 
of the IRAP (and other implicit measures) is observed when the direction 
of an IRAP effect diverges from, or appears inconsistent with, an explicit 
measure (e.g., Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, Gresswell, Hart, & Gore, 2009). Such 
divergent results are typically observed when “psychologically sensitive” 
attitudes or beliefs are targeted. For example, white participants may re-
spond positively toward black people on a standard questionnaire of racial 
prejudice but produce an anti-black IRAP effect (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, 
et al., 2010; see also Power et al., 2009). Furthermore, it appears that par-
ticipants find it difficult to control or “fake” an IRAP effect, even when 
they are instructed to do so (McKenna et al., 2007). In the following sec-
tion, a behavior-analytic explanation for these and related findings will be 
considered.
the Relational elaboration and coherence model: A Relational 
frame theory explanation for the IRAp effect
The first IRAP articles provided an outline of a relational-frame in-
terpretation of the IRAP effect (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 
2006), which is now referred to as the relational elaboration and coher-
ence (REC) model. According to the REC model, specific IRAP trials may 
produce an immediate and relatively brief relational response before the 
participant actually presses a response key. The probability of this initial 
response will often be determined by the verbal and nonverbal history of 
the participant and current contextual variables. By definition, the most 
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probable immediate response will be emitted first most often, and thus 
any IRAP trial that requires a key press that coordinates with that immedi-
ate response will be emitted relatively quickly; if, however, an IRAP trial re-
quires a key press that opposes the immediate relational response, it may 
be emitted less quickly. Thus, across multiple trials, the average latency for 
inconsistent blocks will be longer than for consistent trials. In short, the 
IRAP effect is based on immediate and brief relational responding, which 
is made apparent to the researcher when the behavioral system is put un-
der pressure to respond quickly and accurately.
The foregoing interpretation provides a plausible explanation for 
the basic IRAP effect. But why does the IRAP produce evidence of so-
cially sensitive bias, such as racial stereotyping among white individu-
als, when explicit measures do not (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, et al., 
2010)? According to the REC model, IRAP effects indicative of racial bias 
would likely emerge from exposure to some of the verbal and nonver-
bal contingencies that operate for white individuals who are raised in 
a predominately white culture (e.g., portrayal of young black males in 
the media as violent gang members). In attempting to explain why such 
contingencies do not produce evidence of stereotyping in self-reports, 
the REC model assumes that responses to these measures likely reflect 
relatively elaborate and coherent relational responding. In other words, 
when asked to express an attitude or belief on a particular issue, it is 
likely that a person will produce a relational response that coheres with 
one or more other relational responses in his or her behavioral reper-
toire (see Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, & Dymond, 2001). Imagine, for example, 
that a participant is asked to rate pictures of white and black men as 
“safe” or “dangerous” (apart from race, the pictures are similar), and 
the two races are rated equally on semantic differential scales. Such 
relational responses would likely cohere with other relevant relational 
networks, such as “Apart from race, the pictures are very similar” and 
“It is wrong to discriminate on the basis of race.” The critical point here 
is that explicit measures are typically not completed under high time 
pressure, and thus participants have sufficient time to engage in the ex-
tended relational responding that is needed to produce a response that 
coheres with one or more other relational responses. When exposed to a 
time-pressured IRAP, however, the impact of a participant’s elaborated 
relational responding would be absent or significantly reduced because 
there is insufficient time, on a trial-by-trial basis, to engage in the addi-
tional and sometimes complex relational activity that serves to generate 
a relationally coherent response.
In summary, therefore, the REC model assumes that the IRAP effect, 
when produced under appropriate time pressure, is driven largely by im-
mediate and relatively brief relational responses, whereas explicit measures 
reflect extended and coherent relational networks. or more informally, the 
IRAP captures spontaneous and automatic evaluations, whereas explicit 
measures capture more carefully considered reactions. The core of the REC 
model explanation for the divergence between implicit and explicit measures 
of psychologically sensitive attitudes rests on the following basic assump-
tion: Immediate or automatic evaluative responses may or may not cohere 
with subsequent relational responding; when they cohere, implicit and ex-
plicit measures will typically converge, but when they do not, the measures 
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will typically diverge.16 In other words, it is assumed that participants usu-
ally “reject” their immediate and brief relational responses (or automatic 
evaluations) if they do not cohere with their more elaborate and extended 
relational responding.17
The REC model appears to explain at least some of the specific find-
ings obtained with the IRAP. For example, the difficulty that participants 
experience in faking an IRAP effect is consistent with the model. If an IRAP 
effect is driven by immediate or spontaneous relational responses that are 
the result of historical and current contextual variables, such reactions are 
unlikely to be modified by a simple instruction to “think the opposite.”18 
As an aside, faking has been observed in unpublished research conducted 
by our group, but the practice latency criterion was often not maintained 
during the test blocks. This finding is consistent with the argument that as 
response latency increases on the IRAP, the “contaminating” effects of elabo-
rated relational responding increasingly impact on the measure. (Note that 
faking was also associated with reduced accuracy, but this result is difficult 
to interpret because the critical competition between consistent and incon-
sistent response patterns is not maintained when accuracy falls.) 
A related finding comes from a recent study that showed that reducing 
the practice latency criterion from 3,000 to 2,000 ms served to increase ra-
cial stereotyping effects on the IRAP (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, et al., 2010). 
Such a finding again supports the argument that time pressure moderates 
the contaminating impact of elaborated relational responding (see also 
Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005, who showed that 
overcoming bias on implicit measures is reduced when cognitive capacity 
is diminished). However, the REC model does not predict that decreasing 
time pressure on the IRAP will necessarily produce increasing convergence 
with explicit measures. As time pressure decreases, it is difficult to predict 
exactly what variables will impact on response latency, and thus the poten-
tial utility of the measure is lost. Indeed, results from the Barnes-Holmes, 
Murphy, et al. (2010) study supported this conclusion because the internal 
reliability of the IRAP decreased as latencies increased.
16 The term diverge is used here to indicate effects that do not go in the same direction 
(e.g., if a negative racial bias is observed on the IRAP but not on an explicit measure). Note, 
however, that even when measures diverge in this way they may still correlate positively. For 
example, individuals who produce high levels of negative racial bias on an IRAP may produce low 
levels of positive racial bias on an explicit measure, whereas individuals who produce low levels 
of negative implicit bias may produce high levels of positive explicit bias. Such a pattern would 
produce overall effects that diverge in direction on a graph but correlate positively.
17 It should be noted that the REC model does not predict that additional relational activity 
will always produce a positive response in a psychologically sensitive area. For some individuals, 
additional responding may produce a negative response that coheres with the initial negative 
evaluation (e.g., “The black man in the photograph looks dangerous and it is okay to discriminate 
on the basis of race”). Alternatively, additional responding may produce a relational response 
that allows two initially incoherent networks to cohere (e.g., “The black man looks dangerous, 
but it is wrong to discriminate on the basis of race. However, the black man in this particular 
photograph does look quite dangerous”).
18 If participants are also asked to engage with exemplars that support “thinking the 
opposite” (e.g., Cullen, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009), this may alter the 
probability of immediate relational responding and thus moderate the IRAP effect. Such an 
outcome, however, is not readily defined as “faking” because immediate responding has actually 
been modified by the exemplars.
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Another finding that the REC model appears to explain was reported by 
Cullen et al. (2009). Specifically, a negative bias toward old age on the IRAP 
was found to be malleable using appropriate exemplar training (e.g., view-
ing pictures of admired older people, such as Nelson Mandela), although the 
explicit measures were largely unaffected. The REC model assumes that the 
exemplar training would impact largely on immediate relational respond-
ing but less so on extended and coherent relational networks. Thus, the pro-
old exemplars may have served to evoke old–Positive immediate relational 
responses on the IRAP, but these were subsequently “rejected” during the 
explicit measures because they did not cohere with elaborated relational 
responding. More informally, for participants asked to rate older people in 
terms of “tired” versus “energetic,” some of the old–Positive exemplars may 
well have “come to mind,” but these were rejected as the basis for a rating 
because they were deemed atypical (e.g., “Nelson Mandela is amazing, but 
most old people are still less energetic than most young people I know”).
There are other IRAP data that the REC model appears to explain (see, 
e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, et al., 2010, for an explanation of differential 
trial-type effects), and indeed many of the findings in the broader litera-
ture on implicit attitudes appear to be consistent with the model. Working 
through the relevant material is beyond the scope of the current article, 
but it is worth noting that the REC model bears some similarity to the 
associative– propositional evaluation (APE) model, which has been used suc-
cessfully to explain a wide range of findings in implicit attitudes research 
(e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007; Gawronski, leBel, & Peters, 2007). 
Similar to the APE model, the REC model assumes that brief, immediate re-
lational responses or automatic evaluations (a) may be discriminated (i.e., 
implicit attitudes do not necessarily occur at an unconscious level); (b) are 
sensitive to current contextual factors and are thus not necessarily impervi-
ous to social desirability, self-presentation, or other motivational effects; and 
(c) do not necessarily involve highly stable and long-established responses.19
on balance, unlike the APE model, the REC model does not appeal to 
dual processes (associative and propositional). Rather, the latter appeals to 
the single process of arbitrarily applicable relational responding, as defined 
by RFT.20 Thus, the divergence between implicit and explicit attitudes is 
explained not by the interplay between associative and propositional pro-
cesses, but by the extent to which relational responses are elaborated and 
cohere with each other. Furthermore, the REC model predicts that automatic 
19 Each of these three assumptions follows logically from the REC model’s definition of 
automatic evaluation as inherently behavioral (i.e., as immediate and brief relational responding). 
According to RFT, (a) a relational response may itself participate in a relational frame and as 
such is verbally or “consciously” discriminated (see Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, & Dymond, 2001); 
(b) relational responses are by definition sensitive to current contextual cues (Barnes-Holmes, 
Hayes, Dymond, & o’Hora, 2001); and (c) relational responding, like any response class, may be 
more or less stable and involve relatively short or long behavioral histories (Hayes, Fox, et al., 
2001). 
20 The REC model is not a “single-process” model because, as a behavior-analytic account, 
it allows for the involvement of other behavioral processes apart from relational framing, such as 
respondent conditioning and primary stimulus generalization. Strictly speaking, therefore, the 
REC model is a multi-process model, but one in which the difference between implicit and explicit 
attitudes is not explained by the interaction between distinct psychological processes. Rather, it 
is the elaboration and coherence involved in the single process of relational framing that provide 
the core explanation.
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evaluations are not restricted to simple associations or activations but may 
emerge based on a variety of stimulus relations (see Power et al., 2009, for 
supporting evidence). only further study, however, will determine if the REC 
model offers clear advantages over the APE model, and our research group is 
currently engaged in this work.
conclusion
The IRAP and the REC model are offered here as one possible way in 
which behavior-analytic researchers could analyze and explain the func-
tional similarities and differences between responses that are typically de-
scribed as automatic or implicit versus deliberative. We fully recognize that 
our contribution thus far only scratches the surface, and a great deal more 
work is needed in this area. First, additional research is required to assess 
the reliability and validity of the IRAP across a variety of domains. Second, 
research should examine the impact of potentially important moderating 
variables on the IRAP, focusing on both procedural and participant vari-
ables. Third, attempts should be made to develop the IRAP into an instru-
ment that may be used effectively with individual participants. Fourth, and 
perhaps most important, experimental analyses should focus on the behav-
ioral histories and current contextual variables that establish, maintain, or 
weaken implicit attitudes and moderate their relationships with other verbal 
and nonverbal behavioral measures. This final area of research would also 
provide important tests of the REC model and indeed other alternative ex-
planations for implicit attitudes and beliefs.
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Study Questions
1. Why is it important to distinguish between automatic and deliberative 
responses in the study of attitudes and beliefs?
2. What does the acronym IRAP stand for?
3. What is the name of the behavior-analytic theory that provided the gen-
eral conceptual basis for the IRAP?
4. Studies that involved pitting natural verbal relations against laboratory-
induced derived relations provided a specific conceptual foundation for 
the IRAP. Identify and describe the first study to adopt this strategy.
5. The REP and the IAT were each important cornerstones for the develop-
ment of the IRAP. What do these acronyms stand for?
6. The IRAP was initially called the IREP. What does the latter acronym 
stand for and why was the name changed?
7. Examine the diagram in Figure 1 and draw a similar figure that repre-
sents an IRAP designed to assess implicit attitudes in a domain of your 
choice. Below the four trial-type boxes, list all of the target words or pic-
tures that you would employ in your IRAP.
8. Briefly describe the general sequence of practice and test blocks used in 
a typical IRAP and the performance criteria that are often used to deter-
mine if a participant is allowed to progress from practice to test.
9. Download and run the IRAP software from the IRAP website (http://
psychology.nuim.ie/IRAP/IRAPSoftware.shtml) and briefly describe 
the purpose behind each of the settings presented down the left- and 
right-hand sides of the stimuli-and-settings input screen.
10. Identify the study that explored the impact of reducing the practice la-
tency criterion from 3,000 to 2,000 ms and briefly describe the nature of 
that impact.
11. Why was the warning message “Too Slow” introduced into the 2008 ver-
sion of the IRAP? Describe the process for discarding data when this 
warning message is used in a study.
12. Why is the D
IRAP
 algorithm used to transform latency scores from the 
IRAP? list the steps involved in calculating the four trial-type D
IRAP
 
scores.
13. Examine the graph in Figure 2 and draw a similar graph that repre-
sents hypothetical IRAP data from the study you designed under point 
7 above. Write a brief interpretation of the findings presented in your 
graph.
14. How does a “known-groups” analysis test the validity of an IRAP?
15. Briefly describe what may be considered the most interesting feature of 
the IRAP specifically and implicit measures more generally.
16. What does the acronym REC stand for?
17. Provide a brief description of the REC model’s explanation for the diver-
gence between implicit and explicit measures of psychologically sensi-
tive attitudes.
18. Describe three findings from IRAP research that the REC model appears 
to explain.
19. list three assumptions that the REC and APE models share.
20. How does the REC model differ from the APE model?
21. list four areas in which additional IRAP research is needed.
